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Abstract: A large amount of money has been allocated to the Village and Urban Community 
Fund Program (The Village Fund Program) in Thailand. Justification of the program has to 
be made and more analyses of this village institution should be done so that improvement can 
be made. Financial institutions are important tools in development but the more professional 
ones will last longer. Understanding the relationships among the variables that determine the 
success is necessary in the improvement of such funds, as it helps us understand the self-
governance factors and system of each institution as well as the institutional design that can 
be developed suitably. Credit, as a resource, is limited. The major rules concern the payment 
of the money borrowed and the participants’ strategies involve the decision to pay or not to 
pay. Understanding the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) contributes to the 
institutional design for the outcomes desired. If the outcomes are expected to be sustainable, 
the institutional design has to direct people to discipline, professionalism and self-
governance development concerning the use of funds. 
 
Keywords: Village and Urban Community Fund Program, the Village Fund, self-governance, 
microfinance, IAD framework. 
 
Introduction 
Money is a resource that is different 
from other resources. Different commu-
nities will have different resources with 
different economic and social values. The 
wealth of people in general is therefore 
very much determined by the communities 
to which they belong. The size of the share 
in the resources for each person within and 
outside the community, however, has 
always been a major issue. In every 
community, resources can be very difficult 
to distribute. Proper distribution in terms 
of credit can help to improve equity in 
society.  
Credits can be easily measured, can be 
used to acquire other resources and 
outcomes, and can be effectively evaluated 
in terms of economic values. Governments 
and many international organizations have 
been sponsoring and encouraging credit 
distribution since the process of resource 
use can be sustainable if managed well. 
However, many people cannot take 
advantage of the resources in their 
community because    they don’t  have  the 
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instruments of their wealthier counterparts. 
Credit can therefore allow poor people to 
be better equipped in order to have a more 
equal share of other resources.  
This paper focuses on a particular 
credit distribution system in Thailand, the 
Village Fund program, which is 
significantly different from many other 
credit organizations in that the people in 
the community manage their own fund. 
The Village Fund program is based on 
self-governance. Community members 
have to learn to work together in order to 
make the fund sustainable so that they can 
benefit from it in the long run. They must 
learn to help each other as well as develop 
the accountability required for the 
sustainability of the resources. Villagers 
can develop skills required for self-
governance. Participating in the 
management of the funds helps to develop 
the attitude and skills needed in a 
democratic society in general. Villagers 
can learn by experience that their interest 
can be protected or changed through 
participating in the activities and working 
with other members in their communities. 
They can feel that they are empowered and 
can make changes in their lives. The skills 
and attitude acquired from the process 
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should create a positive impact on at least 
economic and political development. 
Self-governance is inseparable from 
the concept of democracy and 
development. Since democracy is a 
“system of government where people 
govern themselves” (Bickers and 
Williams, 2001) the practice of local self-
organized institutions may be a crucial part 
of development at the grassroots level. 
People in the rural areas of Thailand can 
learn to enjoy participation and developing 
self-governance attitudes. This process 
will contribute to the emergence of a more 
developed democratic system in Thailand 
as the skills and the attitudes of those 
involved improve. They can develop the 
skills and attitudes necessary to manage 
the resources they share, which will most 
likely enable them to create more 
opportunities and choices for themselves. 
In their effort to understand the 
“fundamental changes that are required for 
stable foundation for sustainable self-
governance”, McGinnis and Ostrom 
(1999) look at democracy “as a series of 
ongoing ‘transformations’ in the 
fundamental attitudes of people towards 
themselves and the physical world around 
them.” In the process of development and 
self-governance, it is necessary to 
understand how the attitudes of people are 
transformed since decisions concerning 
resource sharing are affected by their 
attitudes. Thus, understanding people’s 
attitudes and their decisions is necessary 
for the study of the management of 
resources in society.    
 
The Village Fund Program 
In 2000, a major grass roots economic 
policy proposed by the Thai Rak Thai 
party as part of its political platform during 
the general election campaign was to 
provide one million baht (about 33,000 US 
dollars) to every village in order to start a 
so-called ‘Village Fund,’ officially named 
the Village and Urban Community Fund 
Program.       After Prime Minister Thaksin  
was elected and successfully formed the 
first Thaksin government, the program was 
launched with a budget of 80 billion baht. 
The program objectives were to: (1) create 
a source of fund for investment; (2) 
develop the fund management capability; 
(3) develop village self-sufficiency; (4) 
stimulate grass root economy and reduce 
economic and social vulnerability; and (5) 
strengthen economic and social capacity. 
Criticisms have been mainly leveled at the 
use of the money which the borrowers 
received. If the money were not used 
wisely, people would just end up with 
more debt they could not pay back and the 
budget would be drained away. The 
opposition party claimed that the 
government encouraged Thai people to 
incur more debts and created more 
unnecessary debt burden. 
The social and economic impact of the 
Village Fund program can be substantial, 
particularly in remote rural areas. The 
amount of money put into this project has 
to be justified. It is hoped that the money 
transferred to villages and communities 
will sustain. Some evaluations based on 
the period of operation have been carried 
out by institutions such as the National 
Board of Village and Urban Community 
Fund (2002), Thamasat University (2003), 
and the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) (2004). 
Based on these evaluations, the 
government has claimed success in terms 
of repayment rate and satisfaction of the 
borrowers. To successfully evaluate and 
improve these institutions in rural areas it 
is necessary to have a framework within 
which to work. The Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework (IAD) may 
be a significantly contributive approach in 
helping the understanding of the village 
fund organizations for the purpose of 
improvement and development of the 
institution in the future (institutions are 
expected to develop into village banks 
with more complicated networks among 
themselves). 
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Self-Governance, Institutions and 
Development 
As a program established for the 
benefit of the people and endowed with a 
large budget, it is hoped that the 
institutions involved in the operation of the 
Village Fund and the resources (money) 
managed can be sustainable so that 
benefits can be multiplied with the largest 
positive impact. In a self-governance 
process with established norms, rules and 
institutions available for solving collective 
problems, the sustainability of the 
institutions is a major question (McGinnis 
and Ostrom 1999). 
The Village Fund program is not only 
an important platform for villagers to learn 
the skills necessary for self-governance but 
is also a big test as to whether they can 
make collective decisions in managing 
their resources effectively. The process can 
raise their awareness in terms of their roles 
regarding democracy and self-governance, 
a crucial step in proving their self-
governance ability. Developing more 
confidence, skills, knowledge and desire to 
have a bigger role in other local and 
national democratic platforms could be 
achieved with successful Village Fund 
institutions. Sustainable self-governing 
institutions could help rural communities 
earn more credibility in managing local 
resources. 
Institutional structures have a 
significant role to play in expanding 
human choices, a fundamental goal of 
economic development (Nicholson, 1993). 
“Institutions affect human choice by 
influencing the availability of information 
and resources, by shaping incentives, and 
by establishing the basic rules of social 
transactions” (Nicholson, 1993). 
Participating in the Village Fund program 
can enhance developmental progress. 
Through a self-governance institution, 
people can voice their opinions, 
understand all the economic choices 
available, and learn to compromise           
to achieve  personal  and  collective  goals. 
Understanding institutions such as the 
Village Fund makes it possible to improve 
the performance of the program. The 
economic choices of the people can also be 
expanded. With the Village Fund program, 
people have an incentive to directly 
participate in the self-governance process 
and benefit from the institution. 
However, the institutions created have 
to be well designed for the development of 
the people. Participation “is a major factor 
of empowerment and an indispensable 
element of self-generated, self-organized, 
and self-sustained development” (Ostrom, 
et al., 1993). The ability of individuals to 
take advantage of institutional possibilities 
demonstrates a “capacity for self-
governance” (Ostrom, 1987 cited in 
Sawer, 1993). The Village Fund program 
requires the participation of people in 
order for them to benefit from the 
program. The skills and confidence 
acquired can make people realize their 
potential in terms of self-governance and 
encourage them to participate in other 
forums of self-governance. Their attitude 
toward democracy as a whole can be 
affected. After all, a major purpose of 
participation in a democratic system is to 
have a voice in the use of the resources 
available. Thus, the development of people 
in terms of political and economic ability 
can be realized. The role of self-
governance in development is crucial. 
According to Sawer (1993) “from 
perceiving development as self-
governance” individuals “interact with 
others at the center of the development 
process,” the emphasis being “on the 
generation of self-reliance.” Social 
development can be claimed from the 
implementation of the Village Fund 
program if, through participating and 
working together in the decision-making 
process, people can increase self-
governance ability and communities can 
be strengthened and less vulnerable to 
external forces such as economic and 
political fluctuations. 
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The Politics of Resources 
The Village Fund program aims at 
distributing more money to rural areas in 
order to stimulate the economy from the 
grassroots, which begs the question of 
whether more resources should be 
distributed to rural people in the first place. 
A directly related question should be 
whether rural people have the ability to 
manage these resources well and not drain 
the budget away, especially when large 
amounts of money are involved. This is an 
especially relevant question since 
Thailand’s development has been plagued 
by corruption for ages. The patronage 
system has long caused people to overlook 
the widespread corruption that pervades 
Thai society. And although people criticize 
corruption, many still have the attitude that 
“gifts” could make things easier for them. 
It is a widely accepted practice that when 
dealing with government projects at least 
30 percent of a project value must be set 
aside for authorities. Reports of unfair 
bidding of government projects are quite 
common, which of course raises much 
suspicion with regard to the way the 
Village Fund program may be affected by 
the rampant corruption. Suffice to say that 
rural government organizations at all 
levels have not been earning much respect 
regarding their management of the money 
distributed to them by the central 
government as both local and national 
politicians are very eager to lay their hands 
on the resources made available. 
      That said, rural people deserve the 
right to manage more resources. After all, 
too many of the decisions on resources and 
development have been made by the 
central government for a long time. No 
Thai government has been this generous to 
rural people before and no government has 
earned such great support from rural 
people before. The less privileged people 
deserve the right and the chance to manage 
more of the resources in the country. The 
highest return to rural people appears to 
have  taken  place  under  the  governments  
led by Thaksin Chinawatra. The Village 
Fund program is one of the many 
programs designed for the benefit of the 
poor people. However, a certain degree of 
success in terms of people’s development 
should be shown to justify such programs.  
 
The Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) Framework and 
Microfinance 
     Analyzing the functions and outcomes 
of a particular program requires 
understanding how the variables are 
related to one another so as to see the 
whole picture and avoid drawing 
misleading and hasty conclusions. When a 
collective action is involved, it is 
especially beneficial to understand the 
decision-making process in order to 
predict, evaluate, improve and achieve 
better outcomes. The Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework helps 
to identify the elements (and the 
relationships among them) needed for 
diagnostic and prescriptive purposes 
(Ostrom, 2005). As a shared language for 
institutional analyses, the IAD framework 
facilitates “comparisons among more 
specific theories and models of particular 
phenomena” (McGinnis and Ostrom, 
1999). The emphasis of the IAD 
framework has been on the overall “action 
situation confronting individuals and 
groups engaged in the processes of 
operational choice, collective choice, and 
constitutional choice” (Ibid). The “core 
unit of analysis” (or “focal unit of 
analysis”) is identified as an “action arena” 
which includes an action situation and the 
participant in the situation (Ostrom, 2005). 
An action situation can be characterized by 
seven clusters of variables which include: 
participants, positions, potential outcomes, 
action-outcome linkages, the control that 
participants exercise, types of information 
generated, and the costs and benefits 
assigned to the actions and outcomes 
(Ibid). The framework shown below 
outlines     the    interactions   among     the  
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Figure 1: Framework for Institutional Analysis 
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Source: Ostrom (2005) 
 
exogenous variables, the action arena, 
interaction, outcomes, and evaluative 
criteria. 
According to Ostrom (2005), the 
exogenous variables (the biophysical and 
material conditions, attributes of the 
community, and rules) “jointly affect the 
types of actions that individuals can take, 
the benefits and costs of these actions and 
potential outcomes, and the likely outcome 
achieved.” The action arena is viewed as 
dependent on the exogenous variables. 
 
The Exogenous Variables 
    - The Biophysical and Material 
Conditions of Credit as a Resource 
As Table 1 below shows, common-
pool resources (CPR) have a high 
subtractability and high difficulty of 
excluding potential beneficiaries as 
compared to public goods, private goods 
and toll goods (Ostrom 2005). 
 
Table 1: The Four Basic Types of Goods 
 
  Subtractability of use 
  Low High 
Difficulty of 
excluding 
potential 
beneficiaries 
Low Toll goods 
Private 
goods 
High 
Public 
goods 
CPR 
Source: Elinor Ostrom (2005) 
       
Credit is in a way like a CPR as 
people who are members of the 
community or the program can benefit 
from the program as long as the program 
lasts and the more benefits there are for 
some the less there is left for others over a 
given period of time. As table 2 below 
shows, Credit has a high subtractability of 
use since the amount of money available to 
the rest is reduced by the amount that has 
been borrowed by some. Some potential 
beneficiaries may thus end up being 
excluded. However, it would be difficult to 
exclude participating community members 
from the credit program on the basis of 
wealth (the amount left). Exclusion from 
borrowing is generally based on the 
payment of a loan previously   obtained.   
Nevertheless,   the difficulty of exclusion 
from microcredit is higher than private 
goods as everybody without a bad credit 
record earns credit access. 
 
Table 2: Basic Types of Goods when Taken 
into Account Credit and Knowledge 
 
   Subtractability of use 
  Low High 
Difficulty of 
excluding 
potential 
beneficiarie
s 
Low Toll goods Private 
goods 
 Knowledge Micro 
Credit 
High Public goods CPR 
 
 
Knowledge resulted from training, 
meetings, participation, information and 
skills acquired can be considered a service 
or good of value as it can be used in 
acquiring resources and making use of 
resources in a more efficient way. The 
Biophysical/ 
Material Conditions 
Attributes of  
Community 
Rules 
Action 
Situations 
Participant
s  
Interaction 
Outcomes 
Evaluative 
Criteria 
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knowledge acquired would not reduce the 
amount of knowledge provided. The 
beneficiaries and be excluded to some 
extent, for example, by choice of media 
and venue. Participants in the same 
community, however, are difficult to 
exclude because of the family network in 
the rural community. 
 - The Rules and Attributes of the 
Community 
The two most important rules 
involved in the strategy of participants are 
that: (i) resources belong to the community 
and (ii) they have to be returned within a 
certain period of time or else the borrowers 
could face sanctions. It has been ruled that 
the money has to be returned in one year 
(National Board of Village and Urban 
Community Fund, 2001). This rule, 
however, has proven to be problematic 
(NESDB, 2004). There has been difficulty 
adjusting to it since the rule was not 
created by the community members 
themselves but by …  A major sanction is 
that a borrower unable to repay his/her 
loan on time would not be able to borrow 
any more in the future. He/she could also 
face social pressure from the community. 
The attributes of the community 
consist of a “set of variables that affect the 
structure of an action arena related to the 
concept of the community within which 
any focal action arena is located” (Ostrom, 
2005). The most important attributes 
include: “the values of behavior generally 
accepted in the community; the level of 
common understanding that potential 
participants share (or do not share) about 
the structure of particular types of action 
arenas; the extent of homogeneity in the 
preferences of those living in a 
community; the size and composition of 
the relevant community; and the extent of 
inequality of basic assets among those 
affected” (Ostrom, 2005). 
The size of the community affects the 
amount each can borrow since the money 
distributed to every village concerned is 
one million baht regardless of the need and 
population size (NESDB, 2004). The 
extent of the inequality of the basic assets 
may thus seriously affect the arena, since 
those with more assets need more credit 
for more promising projects with higher 
returns, potentially leaving those with 
lower-valued asset with less money to 
borrow. Although the amount of a loan 
depends on the rules and fund committee, 
those with a higher potential to pay back 
may turned out to be favored. Higher 
homogeneity could create a more positive 
impact in terms of communication and 
cooperation. The values and common 
understanding of the people affect their 
strategy. The values of people with regard 
to the use of money, the importance of the 
sustainability of the fund, the common 
understanding of the consequences of not 
returning the money as well as the goals of 
the funds can have a great impact on their 
decisions.    
 
The Action Arena 
The participants at the operational 
level in an action arena making decision 
on loan payments are the borrowers. When 
making a decision concerning a loan 
repayment, each borrower will consider 
strategically what the other participants 
will do and the outcomes of their 
decisions. Participants can be divided into 
two groups, each borrower and the rest of 
the participants. There is a possibility that 
there could be more assistance from the 
government in the event some people 
would have a problem repaying the loans 
since a debt suspension program that in the 
past was implemented to help borrowers 
from the Bank for Agriculture and from 
Agricultural Cooperatives has been 
recently resurrected (in 2012) and 
implemented again. The decision of each 
borrower can be whether to pay back 
(sooner or later) or not pay back. If a 
borrower calculates that most people will 
expect future help from the government, 
then social sanctions may not have serious 
consequences since many will be in the 
same boat. However, if people in the 
community expect no more government 
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financial support (such as debt 
suspension), social pressure could be more 
serious, especially if others are paying 
back their loans. In the case of no more 
government support, the fund is all that the 
village will ever have, so not repaying 
would mean taking advantage of the rest of 
the community or having a free ride. And 
paying back late would mean that some 
would have to wait longer for their turns. 
The decision made by borrowers may also 
be affected by characteristics such as race, 
education, age, culture, and so on. 
Moreover the amount borrowed and the 
effects of social sanctions will be 
compared before a decision is made. 
Borrowers have two basic strategies; pay 
back or not pay back. Depending on what 
others do in the community, these two 
basic options can give rise to four different 
scenarios with four different results:  
1. The borrower pays back the loan 
while the others do not.   
Result: there is a higher possibility of 
additional government support because of 
the government’s need for votes in the 
next election. The borrower who pays back 
the loan would miss the opportunity of 
receiving the help while the others benefit 
from the help. No social sanction. 
2. The borrower pays back the loan 
and the others also do.  
Result: lower additional government 
support because of successful operation 
and no opportunity would be missed by the 
borrower. There is no social sanction as 
the borrower fulfills the obligation. 
3. The borrower does not pay back 
while the others pay back. 
Result:    no   additional   government 
support received as the fund in general is 
successful. Tough social sanction as the 
community expects more from the 
borrower. 
4. The borrower does not pay back 
and the others do not pay back. 
Result:  the community receives 
Additional government support. No social 
sanction because everybody benefits from 
the support by the government. 
In order to make a decision, the 
borrower needs to have some knowledge 
about the possibility of additional 
government assistance and compare the 
impact of the sanction with the value of the 
money received and paying back. Both 
extrinsic and intrinsic values are 
considered in terms of costs and benefits 
of action (see Ostrom, 2005). Admittedly, 
each borrower has virtually no power or 
control over the government’s decision 
and the nature of the social sanction that 
would be imposed in the future if acting 
alone with no knowledge of what the 
others would decide. Thus a good system 
of communication is important for each 
individual to be able to select the best 
strategy. Information about the action 
situation and even some extent of control 
over the outcome is crucial.  
An example of the negative 
consequences of not returning the 
borrowed money is the lower degree of 
trust the community would have towards 
the borrower. This may result in lower 
cooperation from the community in other 
activities in the future. A clear 
understanding of this long-run impact is 
necessary in choosing the right strategy. 
Another negative consequence in the event 
the loan money is not returned is the loss 
of an individual’s credit worthiness with 
the program (which would result in a 
lower qualification for future loan 
requests). Of course, the latter sanction 
would be effective only if the situation or 
the game were to be repeated more than 
once and if the credit history of the 
individual can be shared with other lending 
institutions. It is clear that the government 
policy concerning the support for the bad 
debts of the Village Funds can affect the 
attitude and the financial discipline of the 
people and the governance system in the 
rural areas of Thailand. 
An important decision to be made at 
the operational level for an individual 
borrowing from the Village Fund Program 
is whether to return the money borrowed, 
when and for what amount. Such decisions 
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at the operational level can obviously 
affect the financial sustainability of the 
program significantly. Among the many 
factors that may affect people’s decisions, 
the rules put in place and the situation of 
the people concerned have a significant 
impact. Fixed rules rigidly applied across 
all the villages may, for various reasons, 
cause borrowers difficulty in paying back 
their loans. If pressured too much, the 
borrowers may have to borrow from other 
sources (including shark loans) to pay back 
on time. The pressure from the community 
may therefore be the direct result of the 
conditions set by the government. For 
example, funds that enjoy a high 
repayment rate could apply for more 
funding.  
The government, on the other hand, 
may send a signal through a patronage 
policy such as debt suspension policy for 
farmers.  If more flexibility were preferred, 
members could voice their demands for a 
change of rules at meetings or vote for a 
new committee. Any major rule change, 
however, needs to be approved by the 
government, a different action situation. 
 
Conclusion 
Both the initiation and implementation 
of the Village Fund program have been a 
great challenge to the self-governance 
system and the process of economic, 
political and social development. Large 
amounts of initial funding have been 
provided by the central government for 
this program which is different from other 
investments in that it requires people in the 
community to manage the fund themselves 
(self-governance). It is expected to have a 
wide impact on rural people all over 
Thailand. The impact can be very high at 
the grassroots level. 
Since microcredit is a product with a 
high subtractability of use, high discipline 
and professionally operated institutions   
are required to ensure that most people can 
 
 
have access to the fund and that the fund is 
sustainable.  Based on political incentives, 
it has involved a large budget and could be 
a great threat to any future microfinance 
policy if the funds provided are not 
sustainable. It could be causing people to 
rely more and more on government 
assistance instead of being more self-
reliant if not carefully managed. High 
stakes are placed on the self-governance 
and development process. It is therefore 
necessary to design and develop 
institutions that ensure sustainability, that 
is, institutions in which people have 
confidence. It is also important that people 
in the community have the capability to 
exercise self-governance in a sustainable 
way. The signal from the government has 
to be clear that there is limited assistance 
and resources if self-governance is not 
developed. This program could end up 
having a positive as well as a negative 
impact on the people and on the local 
economy. Still, it may be easier to cure 
economic problems than human attitudes, 
which will shape the perception of both 
government and self-governance for a long 
time. Designing an institution for every 
community to manage funds is not an easy 
task as it involves human development. 
Understanding the variables of Village 
Fund institutions and their impact on the 
program outcome is necessary in designing 
these institutions. The development of 
people should be monitored to justify 
continuity and solve the institutional 
problems that exist. Progress in terms of 
self-governance achievement should help 
justify the institutions and contribute to the 
improvement and sustainability of the 
program. As a matter of fact, the Village 
Fund institutions may prove to be a 
significant boost to the human and self-
governance capacity development of rural 
people in Thailand if taken seriously by 
the government and operated 
professionally. 
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